Review - The Next Decade - Page 3

3. Influx of American support and investment in Argentina.

In the next coming decade, while maintaining friendly relations with Brazil, the United States should also do everything it can to strengthen Argentina, the one country that could serve as a counterweight. It should be remembered that early in the twentieth century Argentina was a major power in Latin America. Its current weakness is not inevitable. The United States should work toward developing a special relationship with Argentina in the context of a general Latin American development plan that also includes resources devoted to Uruguay and Paraguay.

Friedman cites the American goal as slowly helping to build Argentina's economic and political capabilities. He predicts that Brazil will surpass Argentinian efforts at economic growth and expansion -- that soon (nearing the end of the 2010's, reportedly) they will require a continental foil to match their excess. Spoken like Machiavelli himself:

The United States should also be prepared to draw the American military closer to the Argentine military, but through the civilian government, so as not to incite fears that the U.S. is favoring the Argentine military as a force in the country's domestic politics. If necessary, this entire goodwill effort can be presented as an attempt to contain Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. It will all cost money,, but it will be much cheaper, in every sense, than confronting Brazil in the 2030s or 2040s over control of the South Atlantic.

2. Russian alliance with Germany. An American alliance with Poland as a result thereof.

This one is a little complex -- but the reasoning sound. Germany needs natural resources and doesn't pander much to the needs of the EU; Russia (which has natural resources) needs German money, professional talent and the general stability of a long-term viable partner. Friedman conducts a lengthy argument for the support of a German-Russo alliance, with the Americans tagging along with the Poles in-tow to help bolster a balance and destabilize the forming of a potential super-power from the combination of German and Russian interests.

1. The United States allies with Iran.

Now here's a whopper. Can you imagine the States forming an alliance with one of their bitter rivals from the Gulf, like Iran?

In the next decade, the most desirable option with Iran is going to be delivered through a move that now seems inconceivable. It is the option chosen by Roosevelt and Nixon when they faced seemingly impossible strategic situations: the creation of alliances with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. Roosevelt allied the United States with Stalinist Russia and Nixon aligned with Maoist China, each to block a third power that was seen as more dangerous. In both cases, there was intense ideological rivalry between the new ally and the United States, one that many regarded as extreme and utterly inflexible. Nevertheless, when the United States faced unacceptable alternatives, strategic interest overcame moral revulsion on both sides. The alternative for Roosevelt was a German victory in World War II. For Nixon it was the Soviets using American weakness caused by the Vietnam War to change the global balance of power.

The need for a strategic alliance like this would be tiered: fire and foremost, they need to continue a flow of oil that's not outrageously expensive. To achieve this feat at a time when they're pulling forces out of the area and must reduce their presence overseas, gestures of peace and mutual benefit wouldn't seem completely preposterous. Consider also that Iran, a sizeable threat in itself, has seen American forced deployed upon its eastern and western borders. They undoubtedly would prefer to not see American forced again within the near future -- and ultimately, survival of the current regime will likely be the highest priority.

In trying to imagine a U.S.-Iranian detente, consider the overlaps in these countries' goals. The United States is in a war against some - but not all - Sunnis, and these Sunnis are also the enemies of Shiite Iran. Iran does not want U.S. troops along its eastern and western borders. (In point of fact, the United States does not want to be there either.) Just as the United States wants to see oil continue to flow freely through Hormuz, Iran wants to profit from that flow, not interrupt it. Finally, the Iranians understand that the United States alone poses the greatest threat to their security: solve the American problem and regime survival is assured.

But by this time, you've likely found several problems with this prediction. What about Israel? Wouldn't they feel threated and betrayed by a bolstered and U.S.-backed Iranian force in the region?

Friedman proposes than an invasion of Israel would make little tactical or strategic sense, regardless of Iranian rhetoric concerning the Israeli people. Besides that, even though Israel would no longer be backed by American funds and resources, within the future Friedman sees, they still have a large arsenal for ready deployment with a strong economy to back it.

What about the populace at home? Wouldn't they exhibit great hostility toward an administration cozying with a known rival like Iran?

When Roosevelt made his arrangement with Stalin, he was political vulnerable to his right win, the more extreme elements of which already regarded him as a socialist favorably inclined to the Soviets. Nioxon, as a right=wing opponent of Communism, had an easier time. President Obama will be in Roosevelt's position, without the overwhelming threat of a comparatively much greater evil -- that is, Nazi Germany.

The key to balancing domestic opinion would be to create an even greater good to strive for that necessitates partnering with less-than-reputable bed-fellows. We've seen it plenty of times before. However, one caveat to this prediction that Friedman does not address is that bolstering an unpredictable Iranian regime that already has a nuclear advantage over several of its rivals is already poised for local hegemony -- wouldn't this run counter to the American foreign policy

Let us know what you think.